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I. Introduction
In January 2011, the California Supreme Court ruled in People v. 
Diaz that police officers do not need a warrant to search a portable 
electronic device incident to a lawful arrest.1  Moreover, the officers 
need not have probable cause or even reasonable suspicion that the 
device contains evidence or other information pertinent to the crime 
of arrest.2  The court justified its ruling by relying on United States 
Supreme Court precedent in the area of Fourth Amendment search 
and seizure doctrine, citing to well-known and decades-old cases for 
support.3
* University of California, Hastings College of the Law, J.D. Candidate 2013.
  With the United States Supreme Court unwilling to clarify 
exactly how new technology should be dealt with under the Fourth 
Amendment, perhaps the high court of California did the best that it 
1. People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 511 (Cal. 2011).
2. Id. at 503.
3. Id. at 504.
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could under the circumstances.  If this was the case, the California 
legislature did not agree. 
After the Diaz decision in January, Senator Mark Leno, a 
Democrat representing San Francisco, took matters into his own 
hands and drafted Senate Bill 914.4  In short, the bill would have 
overturned the Court’s decision and required law enforcement to 
obtain a search warrant from a neutral magistrate before searching 
arrestees’ portable electronic devices. 5   The bill passed with 
overwhelming support from both political parties in the State 
Assembly and State Senate and needed only Governor Brown’s 
signature or tacit approval to become law.6  Governor Brown vetoed 
the bill in October 2011, stating, “[t]he courts are better suited to 
resolve the complex and case-specific issues relating to constitutional 
search-and-seizure protections.”7
This note will first provide a brief summary of Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure doctrine, specifically the warrant 
requirement and its existing exceptions.  It will then discuss the 
current state of the law regarding searching portable electronic 
devices and suggest what approach the United States Supreme Court 
should adopt to resolve the confusion surrounding the issue.  The 
second half of the Note will take a closer look at Senate Bill 914, 
including its legislative history, why it is necessary, and possible 
unstated reasons why it was vetoed.  Lastly, the Note will argue that 
Governor Brown should not have vetoed Senate Bill 914 based on his 
given explanation, because the legislature, rather than the courts, 
should resolve complex technological issues. 
 
II. Background
A cell phone is no longer merely a portable version of the 
landline telephones from previous generations. 8   In fact, today’s 
smartphones tend to more closely resemble a computer rather than a 
regular telephone.9
4. S.B. 914, 2011-2012 Sess. (Cal. 2011) http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-
12/bill/sen/sb_0901-0950/sb_914_bill_20110902_enrolled.pdf  (last visited Nov. 11, 2012). 
  In addition to making phone calls, smartphones 
5. See id.
6. Id.
7. Governor Edmund Brown, Veto Message (Oct. 9, 2011), 
http://gov.ca.gov/docs/SB_914_Veto_message.pdf. 
8. S.B. 914 § 1(b), 2011-2012 Sess. (Cal. 2011) http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-
12/bill/sen/sb_0901-0950/sb_914_bill_20110902_enrolled.pdf  (last visited Nov. 11, 2012).
9. Id.; Smartphones are defined as modern cell phones that “[provide] digital voice
service… text messaging, e-mail, Web browsing, still and video cameras, MP3 players,
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can access the Internet via mobile networks or a wireless hotspot, 
take pictures and videos, download and play music and videos, access 
bank accounts, provide navigation assistance, access a remote storage 
hard drive, and perform a myriad of other functions.10  Remarkably, 
new applications for smartphones even allow users to check the oil 
and tire pressure in their vehicles, along with turning on, locking, and 
unlocking the car.11  Developers are currently working on cell phones 
that have all of the same capabilities as laptops, providing a 
convenient substitute for personal computers. 12   Moreover, with 
access to any remote storage drive or data sharing system such as 
iCloud, it is possible to access every file stored on a home computer 
or virtual network from anywhere with Internet access.13
DigitalBuzzBlog reports that an estimated 4 billion mobile 
phones were in use worldwide in 2011, and 1.08 billion of those 
phones were smartphones.
 
14  In the United States alone, nine out of 
ten people are mobile phone subscribers.15  This number does not 
even include other portable electronic devices, such as iPads or 
tablets, which provide mobile Internet access without phone calling 
capabilities.16
Needless to say, mobile phones are widely used in society today 
and people are extremely dependent on them.  Individuals and 
businesses alike have grown to depend on them for communicating 
important (and not so important) information on the go.
 
17
video viewing and often video calling. In addition to their built-in functions, smartphones 
can run myriad applications, turning the once single-minded cellphone into a mobile 
computer.” Definition of: Smartphone, PCMAG.COM, 
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=Smartphone&i=51537,00.asp (last 
visited on Feb. 10, 2012). 
  With such 
a rapidly developing medium, it is not surprising that state and federal 
law have not kept up with the advancing technology.  However, what 
10. iPhone, APPLE.COM, http://www.apple.com/iphone/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
11. CES: Coming Soon: Control Car Functions from Smartphone with AutoBot,
CNET.COM, (Oct. 27, 2010, 10:16 AM), http://reviews.cnet.com/8301-13746_7-20020816-
48.html.
12. Smart Phone Functions Seep Into All Sectors, PHYSORG.COM (Jan. 16, 2011),
http://www.physorg.com/news/2011-01-smart-functions-seep-sectors.html. 
13. iCloud, APPLE.COM, http://www.apple.com/icloud/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
14. Infographic: Mobile Statistics, Stats & Facts 2011, DIGITALBUZZBLOG (Apr. 4,
2011), http://www.digitalbuzzblog.com/2011-mobile-statistics-stats-facts-marketing-
infographic/. 
15. Statistics: The Growth of Mobile into 2011, DIGITALBUZZBLOG, (Nov. 21, 2010),
http://www.digitalbuzzblog.com/mobile-statistics-2011-growth-of-mobile/ 
16. iPad, APPLE.COM, http://www.apple.com/ipad/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
17. See iPhone, supra note 10.
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is surprising—and alarming—is just how far behind the law is, and 
what this means for the privacy rights of billions of Americans. 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s recent actions suggest that it 
is in no hurry to take on the challenge of applying the Fourth 
Amendment’s search and seizure doctrine to twenty-first century 
technology.  For example, in recent terms, the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari to both State v. Smith and People v. Diaz, leaving a split 
amongst the states as to whether warrantless searches of cell phones 
incident to arrest are constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.18  
Additionally, although the Court could have provided guidance in the 
area of modern technology when it decided the case United States v. 
Jones this year, the opinion supplied very little direction.19
In Jones, the Court determined whether law enforcement’s 
attachment of a Global Positioning System (GPS) to a car was a 
“search” under the Fourth Amendment.
 
20   While the Court 
determined that attaching the device to the car was indeed a search, 
Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion did so by focusing on the physical 
trespass rather than the information electronically transmitted from 
the device.21  Because GPS technology involves the use of digital 
information, much like cell phones and other modern developments, 
the Court could have taken this opportunity to provide guidance as to 
when a warrant is necessary when dealing with novel technologies.22
Justice Alito’s concurrence recognized the limitations in the 
plurality opinion, pointing out that the issue was actually the use of 
the information gathered from the GPS rather than the physical 
attachment of the device.
 
23
18. State v. Smith, 920 N.E. 2d 949 (Ohio 2009), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 102 (2010);
People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501 (Cal. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 94 (2011). 
  Furthermore, Justice Alito questioned 
whether the trespass theory used by the plurality would be of any 
help to future electronic searches that do not involve a physical 
19. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012).
20. Id. at 948.
21. Id. at 949.
22. U.S. v. Jones: The Battle for the Fourth Amendment Continues,
HUFFINGTONPOST, (Jan. 24, 2012, 7:02 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-w-
whitehead/us-v-jones-surveillance-technology_b_1224660.html.  “The Court should have 
clearly delineated the boundaries of permissible surveillance within the context of rapidly 
evolving technologies and reestablishing the vitality of the 4th amendment.  Instead the 
justices relied on an ‘18th century guarantee against un-reasonable searches, which we 
believe must provide at a minimum the degree of protection it afforded when it was 
adopted.’” (quoting Jones,  132 S.Ct. at 953.). 
23. Jones, 132 S.Ct.  at 958–59 (Alito, Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, JJ., concurring).
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intrusion.24  The Supreme Court has previously ruled that, when 
interpreting the holding of a plurality decision, “the holding of the 
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who 
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.”25
Jones provided the perfect opportunity to answer the increasingly 
important question regarding when cell phones and other portable 
electronic devices can constitutionally be searched and seized by the 
government.  Unfortunately, the Court’s plurality avoided this issue 
to the best of its ability.
  In this case, 
the rule appears to be only that attaching a GPS device to a car is 
indeed a search under the Fourth Amendment. 
26 The plurality of Justices ignored the 
difficult issue of electronically transmitted information and instead 
reiterated what was already known: that a physical intrusion by the 
government onto an individual’s property is indeed a search under 
the Fourth Amendment. 27
III. The Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Doctrine
  With the Supreme Court currently 
unwilling to create a new rule for cell phones and other portable 
electronic devices, lower courts are left struggling to fit new 
technology into old Fourth Amendment precedent. 
As a preliminary issue, it is important to recognize how cell phone
searches fall within the purview of the Fourth Amendment.  The text 
of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects 
“the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. . .”28  One 
way cell phones fit into the scope of the Fourth Amendment is under 
the “papers and effects” language.  Depending on how advanced their 
technology, cell phones can hold or access an unlimited number of 
digital files, the equivalent of actual papers being scanned and 
uploaded onto a server.29  The “paper” analysis is not limited to 
smartphones, as non-smartphones may still contain text messages and 
phone numbers.30
24. Id.
  This information is comparable to written address 
25. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (opn. of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, J.J.)). 
26. See generally Jones,132 S.Ct. at 957.
27. Id.
28. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
29. See iCloud, supra note 13.
 30. The Evolution of Cell Phone Design Between 1983-2009, 
WEBDESIGNERDEPOT.COM, http://www.webdesignerdepot.com/2009/05/the-evolution-of-
cell-phone-design-between-1983-2009/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2012), (showing that even non-
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books and notes or letters of the Framers’ era.  Just because the 
papers are now in a digital form does not mean they exceed the scope 
of the Fourth Amendment’s protections.  It would have been 
impossible for the drafters to have included “digital information” in 
the text of the Fourth Amendment, because such technology was not 
conceived when the Amendment was ratified in 1791.31
The second way in which the Fourth Amendment covers cell 
phones is that the Amendment’s protections extend beyond a 
person’s physical effects and to instances where the person has a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy.”
 
32  In Katz v. United States, the 
Court held that conversations made inside a public phone booth were 
protected, stating, “[t]”he Fourth Amendment protects people—and 
not simply ‘areas.’”33
A. The Search Incident to Arrest Exception
  If there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
a verbal conversation made inside a public phone booth, surely that 
expectation applies to information stored inside a private cell phone. 
In sum, whether textually or via case law, cell phones are within the 
Fourth Amendment’s reach and are thus protected from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that searches performed
without a warrant are “per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”34  One of 
these exceptions is the search incident to arrest, as established in 
Chimel v. California.35  In Chimel, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that 
upon a lawful arrest, officers were justified in searching the arrestee’s 
person and the area within his “immediate control.”36
smartphones have SMS capabilities); Definition of SMS Text Messaging: What is SMS 
Messaging, Text Messaging?, ABOUT.COM, 
http://cellphones.about.com.od/phoneglossary/g/smstextmessage.htm, (last visited Feb. 12, 
2012). 
  For a while, the 
justifications for the incident to the arrest exception seemed to differ 
in theory and in practice.  Initially, these searches were allowed 
without a warrant in order to ensure officer safety, prevent escape, 
31. Historic Documents, USHISTORY.ORG, 
http://www.ushistory.org/documents/amendments.htm#amend04, (last visited Feb. 12, 
2012) 
32. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 353. (majority opinion).
34. Id. at 347.
35. Chimel v.California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
36. Id..
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and preserve evidence. 37   A year later, however, the three 
justifications were downplayed in United States v. Robinson.38  There, 
the Court held that, while the search was initially based on one of the 
Chimel justifications, whether a search incident to arrest is later found 
valid “does not depend on what a court may later decide was the 
probability . . . that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon 
the person of the suspect.”39  The Court reasoned that when an 
individual is lawfully arrested, the search of the arrestee is reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment. 40   Robinson expanded law 
enforcement’s power in conducting searches incident to arrest, 
allowing officers to perform searches even when there was no present 
danger or risk of evidence destruction.41
Law enforcement held this power until recently, when the Court 
decided Arizona v. Gant in 2009.
 
42  In Gant, the defendant was 
arrested for driving with a suspended license and placed in handcuffs 
in the back of a patrol car.43  The police proceeded to search the 
vehicle and found drugs in the pocket of a jacket on the back seat of 
the car.44  Although the search was incident to the arrest, none of the 
justifications enunciated in Chimel applied in this case.45  The arrestee 
could not have destroyed evidence, reached for a weapon, or escaped 
from his position in the back of the police vehicle.46  Justice Stevens 
wrote, “[i]f there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the 
area that law enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications 
for the search  incident to the arrest exception are absent and the rule 
does not apply.” 47   Thus, while cases still cite to Robinson’s 
deferential ruling, it seems as if Chimel’s justifications are once again 
alive and well.48
37. Id.
 
38. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973).
39. Id. at 235.
40. Id.
41. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 237.
42. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
43. Id. at 335.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.at 337–38, 339.
47. Id. at 339.
48. Courts may still cite to Robinson because they understand that it is impractical to
judge the searching officers’ decisions in hindsight. If the officers legitimately believed one 
of the Chimel justifications existed at the time of the search, courts may not want to punish 
them or the prosecution by looking to actual probability when determining the 
admissibility of the evidence recovered. 
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B. Case Law: When are Warrantless Cell Phone Searches Constitutional?
Without guidance from the United States Supreme Court, the
district and state courts have naturally been all over the map trying to 
apply search incident to the arrest doctrine to cell phones and other 
novel technologies. 49   The majority of decisions find that law 
enforcement may constitutionally search cell phones incident to arrest 
without a warrant.50  On the other hand, recent cases criticize the 
analysis of these decisions and make a compelling argument for 
considering warrantless cell phone searches a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.51
In the 2007 case United States v. Finley, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals upheld a warrantless search of Finley’s cell phone incident to 
an arrest for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine.
  Two cases, United States v. Finley and Ohio v. State, 
provide an example of how lower courts are grappling with applying 
old law to new technological situations. 
52
The court cited Robinson, stating that police officers “may also, 
without any additional justification, look for evidence of the 
arrestee’s crime on his person in order to preserve it for use at trial.”53  
Attempting to fit new technology into old precedent, the court then 
referred to the Supreme Court case New York v. Belton, which 
established the “container doctrine.”54  Belton held that, incident to 
arrest, “police may search containers, whether open or closed, located 
within the arrestee’s reach.”55  Because the Finley court found the cell 
phone analogous to a container, the search was valid.56
49. See generally Smallwood v. State, 61 So.3d 448, 462 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011);
People v. Diaz, 51 Cal.4th 84,88 (2011); Fawdry v. State, 70 So.3d 626, 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2011), Gracie v. State, 92 So. 3d 806 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011); Hawkins v. State, 307 
Ga. App.  253, 253-54 (2010), cert. granted 290 Ga. 785 (2012); State v. Carroll, 762 N.W.2d 
404, 406 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009), United States v. Curtis, 635 F.3d 704 (5th Cir. 2011); United 
States  v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 
50. Smallwood, 61 So. 3d at 462; Diaz, 244 P.3d 501 at 511; Fawdry, 70 So. 3d at 630;
Gracie, 92 So. 3d at 813; Hawkins, 307 Ga. App. at 253–54; Carroll, 762 N.W.2d at 411; 
Curtis, 635 F.3d at 714; Finley, 477 F.3d at 253.  
51. See generally, State v. Smith, 124 Ohio St. 3d 163, 170-71 (2009); United States v.
Davis, 787 F.Supp.2d 1165, 1172 (D. Or. 2011). 
52. Finley, 477 F.3d at 253.
53. Id. at 259-60 (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. at 233-34).
54. Finley, 477 F.3d at 260 (citing New York  v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460–61 (1981)).
55. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460–61(The Court further explained that a lawful arrest
justifies this invasion of privacy.). 
56. Finley, 477 F.3d at 260; (See Smallwood v. State, 61 So. 3d 448 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2011)(applying the container doctrine to uphold cell phone search  incident to the arrest.) 
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Two years later, the Ohio Supreme Court expressly rejected the 
Fifth Circuit’s reasoning.57  In State v. Smith, the court took a closer 
look at the Belton container doctrine, and found that it defined a 
container as “any object capable of holding another object,” 
traditionally referring to physical objects.58  The court decided it was 
illogical to apply this definition to cell phones and other similar 
electronic devices, which are “capable of storing a wealth of digitized 
information wholly unlike any physical object found within a closed 
container.”59
Additionally, the court looked to whether evidence preservation 
or officer safety was at stake when the officers searched the cell 
phone.
 
60  The burden was on the state to present evidence that the 
information on the phone was subject to “imminent destruction.”61  
When the state could not provide such evidence, the court reiterated 
the importance of the Chimel justifications and ruled the search 
unconstitutional.62
C. People v. Diaz
 
People v. Diaz immediately followed State v. Smith, establishing a
discrepancy between California and Ohio Fourth interpretations of 
Amendment law. 63   In Diaz, the defendant was arrested after 
participating in a police informant’s purchase of ecstasy.64  At the 
police station, a detective seized the defendant’s cell phone and 
placed it with the other evidence.65  After ninety minutes passed, the 
detective searched the phone and found an incriminating text 
message. 66   When the defendant filed a motion to exclude this 
evidence because the warrantless search violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights, the trial court ruled against him.67
The California Supreme Court ruled that no warrant is necessary 
for cell phone searches incident to a lawful arrest, regardless of the 
 
57. Smith, 124 Ohio St. 3d at 167) (quoting Belton, 453 U.S. at 460).
58. Id. at 167 (citing Belton, 431 U.S. at 460).
59. Id. at 168.
60. Id. at 169.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Diaz, 244 P.3d at 511.
64. Id. at 502.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 502–03.
67. Id. at 503.
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lack of reasonable suspicion or probable cause.68  In an attempt to 
comply with existing Fourth Amendment United States Supreme 
Court precedent, the Diaz court looked to United States v. Robinson, 
United States v. Edwards, and United States v. Chadwick, and decided 
the primary issue was whether the cell phone was “immediately 
associated with [the defendant’s] person.”69  If so, the search was 
constitutional despite the fact that it was ninety minutes after the 
arrest. 70  If the cell phone was found to be property under the 
immediate control of the individual rather than “on his person,” then 
the ninety minute period removed the search from the incident to 
arrest category, and the search was unconstitutional without a 
warrant.71
Using language from the existing cases, the court held that the cell 
phone did fall into the “closely associated with his person” category.
 
72  
In doing so, the court expressly rejected the defendant’s argument 
that the character of the item should be taken into account when 
deciding the constitutionality of the search.73  The Diaz majority 
noted that no United States Supreme Court decision ever held that 
the character of the item must be considered.74
D. An Analysis and Criticism of Diaz
 
The three United States Supreme Court cases relied upon by the
Diaz majority were decided decades before cell phones were even 
invented.  In Robinson, incident to a lawful arrest, a police officer 
conducted a pat-down search on the arrestee and found a crumpled 
up cigarette package in his pocket.75  When he opened the package, 
he found heroin capsules.76
68. Id. at 502.
  The United States Supreme Court upheld 
the search because the police officer had the authority to conduct “a 
full search of the arrestee’s person” under the incident to arrest 
69. Id. at 505 (quoting United States  v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1977); (Even
though the Diaz court was also looking at the more specific issue of remoteness in this 
case, when the search is no longer “ incident to arrest,” it does not detract from the 
discussion on cell phone searches  incident to the arrest generally.) See also Robinson, 414 
U.S. at 234; United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802-803 (1974). 
70. Diaz, 244 P.3d at 506.
71. Id. at 505–06.
72. Id. at 506.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 504 (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. at 222-23).
76. Id.
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exception.77  In Edwards, ten hours after the defendant was arrested 
for attempting to break into a post office, the police officers seized 
and searched the clothes he was wearing. 78   When the defense 
objected that the length of time between the search and the arrest was 
too great to be considered “incident to arrest,” the Court disagreed 
and upheld the search.79  Finally, in Chadwick, the defendants had a 
large footlocker in the trunk of their car when federal agents lawfully 
arrested them.80  Ninety minutes after the arrest, the agents searched 
the locker without a warrant and found contraband.81  The Court 
created the distinction upon which the Diaz court later relied: a 
search “of the person” ninety minutes after arrest can be upheld 
under the incident to the arrest exception, while such a search of 
“possessions within an arrestee’s immediate control” cannot.82  The 
Court ruled that the search of the footlocker was unconstitutional 
because it was a search “of the person.”83
The majority of the Diaz court treated Robinson, Edwards, and 
Chadwick as controlling precedent to which it must strictly adhere.
 
84  
In blindly following these cases, the court overlooked fundamental 
differences that weaken the power of the precedent itself.85  For 
instance, the majority opinion abruptly dismissed the defendant’s 
suggestion of looking to the character of a cell phone simply because 
no United States Supreme Court case explicitly requires its character 
be taken into account.86
Instead, the Diaz court tried to force this modern situation into 
the rigid framework of Chadwick, Edwards, and Robinson by 
analogizing a cell phone to a physical container, or even a cigarette 
package.
 
87
77. Id.  (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235).
  This is an absurd result.  The legal system would not work 
78. Id. (citing Edwards, 415 U.S. at 801 (1974)).
79. Id. at 504–05 ( citing Edwards, 415 U.S. at 807).
80. Id. at 505(citing Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 4–5 (1977)).
81. Id.
82. Id. (citing Chadwick 433 U.S. at15).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 506.
85. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping into the Same River Twice: Rapidly
Changing Facts and the Appellate Process, 78 TEX. L. REV. 269, 272. (1999).  (“Appellate 
opinions are only as robust as the facts on which they are based.  When those facts 
evaporate, the opinion on which they rest is weakened as well.”); But see Diaz, 244 P.3d at 
512 (Kennard, Baxter, Corrigan, and George, JJ., concurring) (“In my view, however, the 
recent emergence of this new technology does not diminish or reduce in scope the binding 
force of high court precedent.”). 
86. Diaz, 244 P.3d  at 506.
87. Id. at 506–07.
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if lower courts never ventured beyond what was explicitly stated in 
Supreme Court decisions.  As a practical matter, the United States 
Supreme Court cannot update its decisions every time society 
changes.  Rather, lower courts must be awarded some flexibility in 
applying the law so that they can produce reasonable and rational 
holdings. 
The dissenting opinion in Diaz recognized that existing and 
outdated Supreme Court precedent cannot be read so literally when 
applied to such a vastly different situation. 88   Justice Werdegar 
distinguished cell phones from regular containers by explaining, 
“[n]ever before has it been possible to carry so much personal or 
business information in one’s pocket or purse.”89  Additionally, she 
noted that even United States Supreme Court precedent supports 
differentiating cell phones from other containers, which have been 
traditionally defined as being able to hold another object.90  She 
further pointed out that the Chimel justifications of officer safety and 
evidence destruction are not applicable to cell phones like they are to 
normal containers or clothing.91
Werdegar argues that, even if the test the majority applied was 
correct (whether the search was “of the person” or “of the 
possessions within an arrestee’s control”), the majority erred in 
deciding that question.
 
92  She stated that the information contained in 
the cell phone is “clearly distinct from the person of the arrestee,” 
and that while “[a]n individual lawfully arrested and taken into police 
custody necessarily loses much of his or her bodily privacy, [he] does 
not necessarily suffer a reduction in the informational privacy that 
protects the arrestee’s records.”93
88. Id. at 513(Werdegar, J., dissenting, quoting Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S.
126, 133 (1944)).(88.Id. at 104. In responding to the concurring opinion, the dissent wrote: 
“But where high court precedent is not on all fours with the case at bar, we also must 
remember that the language of Supreme Court decisions is to ‘be read in the light of the 
facts of the case under discussion’ and that ‘general expressions transposed to other facts 
are often misleading.’”). 
 
89. Id. (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 516-17  (Werdegar, J. dissenting) (quoting Belton, 453 U.S. at 460-61 n.4).
91. Id. at 514 (Werdegar, J., dissenting) (“Weapons, of course, may be hidden in an
arrestee’s clothing or in a physical container on the person.  But there is apparently no 
“app” that will turn an iPhone or any other mobile phone into an effective weapon for use 
against an arresting officer (and if there were, officers would presumably seek to disarm 
the phone rather than search its data files) . . . Once a mobile phone has been seized from 
an arrestee and is under the exclusive control of the police, the arrestee, who is also in 
police custody, cannot destroy any evidence stored on it.”). 
92. Id. at 517 (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 517–18 (Werdegar,  J., dissenting).
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The majority and concurring opinions in Diaz mistakenly 
attempted to force new facts into old law, and infringe upon 
Californians’ privacy rights as a result.  Justice Werdegar, while 
recognizing the state court’s inability to overrule the United States 
Supreme Court, correctly realized the need to reevaluate existing 
doctrine in light of modern, evolving technology. 
IV. Senate Bill 914
Recognizing the impact of the Diaz decision on the privacy rights 
of the people of California, Senator Mark Leno of San Francisco 
introduced Senate Bill 914 in February of 2011.94  The explicit intent 
behind the bill was to “reject as a matter of California statutory law 
the rule under the Fourth Amendment . . . announced by the 
California Supreme Court in People v. Diaz.”95  The bill passed 
unanimously in both houses, with a seventy to zero vote in the 
Assembly and thirty-two to four vote in the Senate.96  Despite the 
overwhelming bipartisan support, and to the dismay of many 
Californians, Governor Brown vetoed Senate Bill 914 in October.97  
The bill would have added Section 1542.5 to the California Penal 
Code, prohibiting “the search of information contained in a portable 
electronic device” without a warrant. 98   The legislature broadly 
defines a “portable electronic device” to include “any portable device 
that is capable of creating, receiving, accessing, or storing electronic 
data or communications.”99
Section 1 of the bill states, “[t]he right of privacy is fundamental 
in a free and civilized society,” and emphasizes the capability of 
portable electronic devices to store “an almost limitless amount of 
  It is clear that the lawmakers wished to 
protect not only cell phones, but also any future technology 
warranting the same expectation of privacy. 
94. Documents associated with SB 914 in the Session, CALIFORNIA STATE SENATE,
http://info.sen.ca.gov/cgi-
bin/postquery?bill_number=sb_914&sess=CUR&house=B&site=sen, (last visited Feb. 13, 
2012). 
95. S.B. 914, 2011-2012 Sess. (Cal. 2011) http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-
12/bill/sen/sb_0901-0950/sb_914_bill_20110902_enrolled.pdf  (last visited Nov. 11, 2012). 
96. See Diaz,  244 P.3d at 502–03.
97. Brown, supra note 7.
98. S.B. 914, 2011-2012 Sess. (Cal. 2011) http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-
12/bill/sen/sb_0901-0950/sb_914_bill_20110902_enrolled.pdf  (last visited Nov. 11, 2012). 
(Discussing how many phones are linked to the Internet and have access to servers and 
computers anywhere in the world). 
99. Id. at § 2(b).
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personal and private information.”100  Using the language from Katz, 
the legislature further argues that people using these devices “have a 
reasonable and justifiable expectation of privacy” not only in the 
information held within the device, but also in the information they 
can reach via the Internet.”101  Additionally, the legislature explains 
that cell phones do not pose a threat to officer safety, and seizing the 
phone until a warrant is issued can preserve any evidence at risk of 
deletion.102  In addressing these concerns, the legislature is challenging 
the court’s legal analysis by pointing out that the necessary Chimel 
justifications are not present in these cases.103
A. Support and Opposition
 
Unsurprisingly, Senate Bill 914 had strong supporters and
opponents in both the criminal justice and civil liberty realms.104  The 
following groups supported the bill on the record: the California 
Newspaper Publishers Association, the American Civil Liberties 
Union (“ACLU”), the First Amendment Coalition, California 
Attorneys for Criminal Justice, Californians Aware, California 
Broadcasters Association, Compline, LLC, the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, and Legal Services for Prisoners with Children. 105  
Arguments made by these groups promote the dissenting opinion in 
Diaz and the majority opinion in Smith.106  The ACLU posited that 
searching a cell phone “opens a window into every aspect of . . . 
private life” including, “political views, financial information, 
romantic relationships, and medical information.”107
100. Id. at § 1(a)-(b).
  The newspaper 
groups supported Senate Bill 914 for fear that warrantless searches of 
101. Id. at § 1(b).
102. Id. at § 1(e).
103. Gant, 556 U.S. at 337-38. (Explaining that Chimel justifications are once again
necessary in executing a search  incident to the arrest.); You, and Your Smart Phone, Have 
a Right to Privacy, CALIFORNIA PROGRESS REPORT (June 21, 2011), 
http://www.californiaprogressreport.com/site/you-and-your-smart-phone-have-right-
privacy. (Though the bill seeks to overrule the application of the search  incident to the 
arrest exception to cell phones, it does not treat all other exceptions alike.  Leno made 
sure to leave the “exigent circumstances” warrant exception intact, explaining that cell 
phone searches without a warrant are permitted when “there is an immediate threat to 
public safety or the arresting officer.) 
104. Bill Analysis, SENATE RULES COMM. 2011-2012 Ses. (2011), available at
http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_0901-
0950/sb_914_cfa_20120104_133534_sen_floor.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2012). 
105. Id. at 8.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 8–9.
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their electronic devices would reveal otherwise protected source 
information.108
On the other hand, all of the groups officially opposing the bill 
were in the realm of law enforcement, including: the California 
District Attorney’s Association, the California Peace Officers 
Association, the California State Sheriff Association, the Los Angeles 
County District Attorney’s Office, the Peace Officers Research 
Association of California, and the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s 
Office.
 
109   The Peace Officers Research Association argued that 
overturning the Diaz decision would “restrict their ability to apply the 
law, fight crime, discover evidence . . . and protect the citizens of 
California.”110
B. The Veto
 
Governor Brown’s veto message to the legislature was succinct:
“I am returning Senate Bill 914 without my signature.  This
measure would overturn a California Supreme Court decision
that held that police officers can lawfully search the cell
phones of people who they arrest.  The courts are better
suited to resolve the complex and case-specific issues relating
to constitutional search-and-seizure protections.”111
Senator Leno responded by calling the veto message “incoherent”
and reiterated the importance of protecting privacy rights in 
smartphones, which store a vast amount of private information.112  
Leno also noted that the legislature has “every right to revisit a 
decision by the court,” and that it is the legislature’s duty to make the 
laws and the judiciary’s job to interpret them.113
108. Id. at 9–10 (Article 2 of the California Constitution and section 1040 of the
California Evidence Code protect journalists from forced disclosure of certain 
information. Journalist groups contend that these protections would be useless if their 
electronic devices could be searched without a warrant  incident to the arrest.). 
  Other bill supporters 
have released similar statements, including First Amendment 
109. Id. at 8.
110. Id. at 10.
111. Brown, supra note 7.
112. California governor allows warrantless search of cell phones, CNNTECH, (Oct. 11,
2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-10-11/tech/tech_mobile_california-phone-search-
veto_1_cell-phones-smartphone-text-messages?_s=PM:TECH. 
113. Brown vetoes bill to limit cell phone searches, SFGATE, (Oct. 11, 2011),
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/10/10/BA3H1LFOQ6.DTL. 
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Coalition Executive Director Peter Scheer.114  An unsatisfied Scheer 
criticized Brown’s logic in passing the responsibility back to the courts 
when they already gave their “final word” on the matter.115  Other 
critics are skeptical of Brown’s honesty in the message, and wonder if 
the decision was made purely because of his close relationship with 
law enforcement.116  Many law enforcement groups, including those 
that publicly and vigorously opposed Senate Bill 914, donated large 
amounts of money to Governor Brown’s campaign.117
 Perhaps the most persuasive argument against Governor 
Brown’s reasoning is that it is just plain wrong; the legislature is 
actually “better suited” than the California Supreme Court to apply 
Fourth Amendment protections to novel technologies like cell 
phones.  Law Professor and Fourth Amendment scholar Orin Kerr 
strongly supports this position, concluding, “Governor Brown has it 
exactly backwards” in his veto justification.
 
118
V. The Legislature is the Correct Venue for Resolving Modern
Technological Issues Under the Fourth Amendment 
  The following section 
analyzes Professor Kerr’s argument that legislatures, rather than 
courts, are the correct forum for deciding Fourth Amendment cases 
dealing with new technology. 
Governor Brown mistakenly asserts that the judiciary is the best 
forum for determining how to apply search and seizure issues to new 
technology.119
114. Brown vetoes bill limiting cellphone searches by police, FIRST AMENDMENT
COALITION, (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.firstamendmentcoalition.org/2011/10/brown-
vetoes-bill-limiting-cellphone-searches-by-police/. 
  Although the courts may be competent in upholding 
and applying past precedent in other areas, new technology creates a 
difficult challenge, as it is rapidly changing and increasingly 
ubiquitous in modern society.  For the following reasons, the 
115. Id.  (Peter Scheer comments on Brown’s veto, saying, “The courts have already
addressed the specific issue of searches of cell phones following arrest. The California 
Supreme Court’s decision is the final word, not the beginning of a judicial debate.”). 
116. Calif. Governor Veto Allows Warrantless Cellphone Searches, WIRED.COM,
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/10/warrantless-phone-searches/. 
117. Id. (citing Contributions to BROWN, JERRY, FOLLOWTHEMONEY,
http://www.followthemoney.org/database/StateGlance/contributor_details.phtml?&c=1166
78&s=CA&y=2010&summary=0&so=a&p=1#sorttable, (Last visited, Feb. 13, 2012).) 
(Seven police unions have donated a combined $160,000 to Brown.). 
118. Governor Brown Vetoes Bill on Searching Cell Phones Incident to Arrest, THE 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, (Oct. 10, 2011), http://volokh.com/2011/10/10/governor-brown-
vetoes-bill-on-searching-cell-phones- incident to the arrest/. 
119. Brown, supra note 7.
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California legislature is the correct forum to decide whether cell 
phone searches incident to arrest are constitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment: 1) the California Supreme Court majority incorporated 
outdated notions of technology in Diaz, and 2) the California 
legislature is a superior investigatory body than the California 
Supreme Court. 
A. Technology in People v. Diaz
As discussed earlier in this Note, the court in Diaz applied United
States Supreme Court search and seizure doctrine from the 1970s 
when confronted with a twenty-first century case involving cell 
phones.120
The very nature of the court system necessitates that the decisions 
courts make occur “ex post facto”; that is, courts decide issues by 
looking at events that have already occurred, rather than predicting 
what could happen in the future.
  While the court believed it made perfect legal sense to do 
so, the concept seems illogical from a real world, common sense 
perspective.  The California legislature took the opportunity to enact 
legislation using modern notions of privacy and technology.  The 
court decided the issue in an outdated way and the representatives 
disagreed with its decision.  Governor Brown should not have vetoed 
Senate Bill 914 given the Diaz court’s illogical application of old 
Fourth Amendment doctrine to cell phones. 
121  Superior courts can only decide 
Fourth Amendment technology cases after: 1) the government used 
such technology to conduct a search, 2) the search produced evidence 
that led to an arrest, and 3) the arrestee moved to suppress the 
evidence gathered.122  Only after the superior court resolves an issue 
can the case move to the court of appeals, and only after that, can the 
California Supreme Court choose to exercise its discretionary review 
over the matter.123
Applying such a slow-moving system to rapidly changing 
technology is irrational.  It does little good for the court to create a 
search rule regarding a technology that is now obsolete.
  Thus, it can take years from the actual occurrence 
of an issue before the state high court issues a decision. 
124
120. Diaz, 244 P.3d at 506.
If the 
121. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 868 (2004). 
122. Id.
123. Cal. Const. art. VI, § 12.
124. See Kerr, supra note 121,  at 869.(“By the time the courts decide how a
technology should be regulated, however, the factual record of the case may be outdated, 
reflecting older technology rather than more recent developments.”). 
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technology at issue is no longer being used, the court’s decision is 
only helpful for predicting how the court will treat the current 
technology in the future.  In other words, where the issue involves a 
rapidly changing medium such as cell phones, court precedent is only 
useful to the extent the technology still applies in the future. 
Few cases make it to the United States Supreme Court because 
the Court can pick and choose from thousands of cases throughout 
the country.125  This limits the number of cases lower courts can look 
to for guidance and is especially problematic for courts such as the 
Diaz court, which felt constrained to follow United States Supreme 
Court precedent extremely narrowly.  As Stuart Benjamin explains, 
“[a]ppellate opinions are only as robust as the facts on which they are 
based.  When those facts evaporate, the opinion on which they rest is 
weakened as well.” 126
Legislatures differ greatly from courts in that they do not have to 
wait before they can act.
  Thus, when there is a limited amount of 
outdated Fourth Amendment technology cases, lower courts are left 
struggling to fit new technology into old precedent. 
127  This means that legislatures can regulate a 
new technology while it is still relevant to society.128  Though Senate 
Bill 914 was passed in the legislature the same year that Diaz was 
decided, the bill was able to use practical knowledge and real world 
implications in formulating its approach.129  In doing so, the legislature 
did not ignore existing Fourth Amendment doctrine; instead, the text 
clearly indicates that the legislature wanted to comply with the 
Amendment in affording Californians the privacy rights they are 
entitled.130
While court decisions cannot be quickly reversed if an approach 
does not work, legislative bodies can test various regulatory 
approaches and change law relatively quickly.
 
131
125. See supra note 123.
  The legislature has 
more flexibility and freedom in regulating changing technologies in 
the Fourth Amendment search and seizure context than the courts.  
“[C]onsideration of doctrine, history, and function teach that. . . 
courts should place a thumb on the scale in favor of judicial deference 
126. Benjamin, supra note 85.
127. Kerr, supra note 121, at 870 (“[R]ecent history suggests that legislatures usually
act at a surprisingly early stage, and certainly long before the courts.”] 
128. Id.
129. See S.B. 914, 2011-2012 Sess. (Cal. 2011) http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-
12/bill/sen/sb_0901-0950/sb_914_bill_20110902_enrolled.pdf  (last visited Nov. 11, 2012). 
130. Id.
131. Kerr, supra note 121 at 859.
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when technology is in flux, and should consider allowing legislatures 
to provide the primary rules governing law enforcement 
investigations involving new technologies.”132
B. The Legislature is a Superior Investigative Body
 
Legislatures can spend a significantly longer amount of time than
courts learning about new technologies before they enact a 
regulation.133  Judges usually have a limited time to consider “a brief 
factual record, narrowly argued legal briefs, and a short oral 
argument.”134  Because of the time and resource restriction, attorneys 
and judges often turn to “the crutch of questionable metaphors” to 
aid their understanding of complex technological issues.135  These 
metaphors, often incorrectly applied, can confuse judges down the 
line and lead to misapplied holdings.136
Legislatures, on the other hand, hold multiple hearings in 
different committees, consult poll results, and receive input from 
many independent groups.
 
137  In the hearings, “legislators analyze, 
consult, debate, and hear testimony from both private and public 
interests on every bill.”138  Additionally, the entire legislative process 
is publicly scrutinized, providing a check on the legislature.139
C. What the Future Holds
  The 
legislature is also more in touch with the people of the state they 
represent.  Therefore, in addition to the ability to gather more 
information on the technology itself, the legislature can incorporate 
society’s views on the matter.  In sum, the legislature has many more 
informational resources at its disposal than the California Supreme 
Court. 
With Senate Bill 914 vetoed, it will remain dead unless the
legislature can overturn the veto with a 2/3 vote in each house.140
132. Id. at 805.
  
133. Id. at 875.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
 138. AssemblyMember, CALIFORNIASTATECAPITOLMUSEUM,  
http://www.capitolmuseum.ca.gov/Citizens.aspx?Content2=1060&Content3=1070 (Last 
visited March 1, 2012). 
139. Samantha Trepel, Digital Searches, General Warrants, and the Case for the Courts,
10 YALE L.J. & TECH. 120, 140–41, 143 (2007). 
140. Legislative Process, CALIFORNIA STATE SENATE, 
http://senate.ca.gov/legislativeprocess#step5, (last visited March 1, 2012). 
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Senator Leno has announced that he will try to override the veto next 
year.141
VI. Conclusion
  Looking at the numbers alone, the high passage rate the first 
time around bodes well for overriding the veto.  Eventually the 
United States Supreme Court will have to grant certiorari to resolve 
the issue, unless it decides to leave the question up to each individual 
state. 
The California legislature abided by the constitution and relevant 
United States Supreme Court law when it drafted Senate Bill 914 to 
overrule the California Supreme Court.  Governor Brown’s veto was 
based on the assumption that the courts are the appropriate venue for 
making determinations involving new technology.  This note argues 
that the governor’s statement is incorrect. 
When technology is rapidly changing, courts struggle with 
applying old precedent to new technology.  Because the United States 
Supreme Court can only hear so many cases every year, cases on 
point with relevant facts are difficult to find.  This leaves lower courts, 
such as the Diaz court, at a loss when trying to apply Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure doctrine to cell phone technology in 
2011. 
The legislature, on the contrary, is able to regulate technology 
before it becomes obsolete.  While abiding by the constitutional rules, 
the legislature is able to draft legislation that is both relevant to 
society at the time and flexible when the law changes.  Senate Bill 914 
should not have been vetoed, as the California legislature is the more 
appropriate place to determine whether a warrantless cell phone 
search incident to arrest is a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
141. Smart Phones and Privacy, PRIVACYREVOLT!, (Nov. 28, 2011),
http://consumercal.blogspot.com/2011/11/smart-phones-and-privacy.html. 
